Exceptions and the Rule by Pollak, Louis H
Review
Exceptions and the Rule
Louis H. Pollakt
Congress v. The Supreme Court. By Raoul Berger. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1969. Pp. xiii, 424. $15.00.
Almost half a century has gone by since Justice Frankfurter opined
that Beard's researches had scotched, once and for all, the heresy that
judicial review was a power usurped by Chief Justice Marshall rather
than one foreseen and intended by the Framers.' But heresies die hard.
Corwin, in writings spanning a quarter of a century, argued both sides
of the issue. Louis Boudin popularized the attack on the judiciary.
And, in 1953, Grosskey-having canvassed the Convention and rati-
fying debates, and other original sources, as Beard and Corwin had
done before him-added his not considerable weight to the ranks
of the iconoclasts: in Crosskey's view, judicial authority to invalidate
acts of another branch of government was confined to those instances
in which the integrity of the judicial power was in jeopardy.
On this issue-as on others upon which Crosskey turned his visionary
and revisionary gaze-he won some minor converts. More to the point,
however, Crosskey brought on himself the prompt thunder of the late
Henry Hart.2 And one might have thought Hart's rebuttal would end
the matter. The verdict rendered by Alexander Bickel seemed con-
dusive: "[I]t is as dear as such matters can be that the Framers of the
Constitution specifically, if tacitly, expected that the federal courts
would assume a power-of whatever exact dimensions-to pass on the
constitutionality of actions of the Congress and the President.... "3
But Raoul Berger, a lawyer of great ability and pertinacity, was
reluctant to let the debate rest at that point. He wanted to find out
for himself-once and for all-whether Beard or Crosskey was right.
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1. Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HArM. L. REv. 1002, 1003 nA (924).
2. Hart, Professor Crosskey and Judicial Review, 67 HAiv. L. REV. 1456 (1954), review-
ing 2 W. CROSSKEY, PoLrTcs ,AND THE CONSTrrrToN iN THE HI sroRY OF Tie UNnED STATES
(1953).
3. A. Bxc.m, THE LEAsr DANGmtOus BRaCH 15 (1962).
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He wanted to settle the matter because of its bearing on a related con-
stitutional issue, the extent of Congress's authority, under Article III,
to make "exceptions" to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction-
an authority conventionally characterized, ever since Ex parte Mc.
Cardle,4 as without limit. For if Beard's (and Marshall's) understanding
was correct-namely, that the Framers expected the federal judiciary
to act as a check on the unconstitutional behavior of the elective
branches-what sense would it make to authorize Congress to frustrate
the mechanism by curtailing, or perhaps abolishing entirely, the Su-
preme Court's appellate jurisdiction? The nagging sense that such a
reading of the "exceptions" clause would make the Constitution a
potentially self-defeating document is only underscored (as Berger
fully appreciated) by the settled understanding that Congress is not
obliged to create any inferior federal courts5 and by the very limited
nature of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Putting these
ingredients together, it would appear that Congress could, in theory,
liquidate all federal courts other than the Supreme Court and reduce
that Court to inconsequentiality by abolishing its power to review
state courts." Yet this, as Hart argued in his superb "Dialectic" in 1953,
would appear to be an inadmissible conclusion.7 For Berger, the di-
lemma was such as to force him to reexamine the dilemma's premise-
the validity of judicial review. This is the starting point for the book
Berger has written-and which, very properly, he dedicated to Hart.
Berger's reexamination of the bases of Marshall's opinion in Mar.
bury v. Madison-and of its corollary, Justice Story's opinion in
Martin v. Hunter's LesseeO declaring the Court's power to review
state courts-is an heroic enterprise. Taking nothing for granted,
Berger devotes over two hundred and fifty pages to the painstaking
4. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). Under the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act, McCardle sought
habeas corpus in the circuit court to challenge his military confinement prior to trial by
a military commission established under the authority of certain Reconstruction statutes,
After losing in the circuit court, McCardle appealed to the Supreme Court. Subsequent to
argument, but before decision, Congress-understandably lacking confidence that the Court
would sustain the challenged Reconstruction statutes-enacted, in 1868, a new law with.
drawing the Supreme Court's appellate authority to review circuit court dispositions of
habeas corpus applications authorized by the 1867 Act. The Court held that the 1868 Act
prevented it from proceeding further with respect to McCardle's appeal. But cf. United
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
5. Justice Story to the contrary notwithstanding. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessce, 14 US,
(1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
6. Cf. id.
7. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Ex-
ercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953).
8. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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tracking of the same prey Beard and Corwin and Crosskey pursued
through the same forest primeval. Berger is intrepid, remorseless, and
at last triumphant.
One, two! One, tvo! And through and through
The vorpal blade went snicker-snack!
He left it dead and with its head
He went galumphing back.
"And hast thou slain the Jabbenrock?
Come to my arms, my beamish boy!
O frabjous dayl Callooh! Callayl"
For our era, Jabberwock can now be counted as really dead. No one,
it would seem, will feel called upon to save judicial review again.
If the more than two hundred and fifty pages vindicating Marshall
and Story are a species of historical over-kill, they are balanced (if that
be the correct word) by the dozen pages spent on the "exceptions"
clause: Berger shows that, in the ratification debates, there was ex-
tensive discussion of the "exceptions" clause, but all of it was addressed
to the concerns of those who feared that the Supreme Court, in the
exercise of its appellate authority "both as to Law and Fact," would
be free to overturn jury determinations. The "exceptions" clause was
relied on by proponents of the Constitution to show that Congress
could preclude such appellate interference with the trial process (the
reassurance seems only to have been partially effective, wherefore the
Seventh Amendment). From this Berger infers that the Framers did
not regard the "exceptions" clause as a method of confining, let alone
altogether undercutting, the Supreme Court's power of judicial review.
Thus we are led to Berger's principal conclusion:
Once the legitimacy of judicial review and its central role in the
Constitutional scheme are granted, the power of Congress to make"exceptions" to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction cannot
properly be given unlimited scope. There is no indication whatever
that the Founders conceived the "exceptions" clause as a check
on the Court's Constitutional decisions. It seems hardly reasonable
to conclude that they designed an effective curb on Congressional
excesses and simultaneously furnished Congress with an easy means
of circumventing it. To attribute that dual intention to the
Founders is to charge them with chasing their tails around a stump.
So far as can be gathered from the intensive discussions of the
"exceptions" clause in the Ratification conventions, its purpose
was narrow and altogether unrelated to a power to deprive the
Court of jurisdiction of Constitutional claims. And as is the case
with other powers, the "exceptions" power cannot override the
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guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, which without judicial en-
forcement are mere "parchment" barriers.10
With all respect, the assertion that the "exceptions" clause "cannot
properly be given unlimited scope" does not bring analysis of the
ultimate problems beyond where Henry Hart took it in 1953. Thus
(to take one crucially important example) we can be reasonably con-
fident that the "exceptions" clause and the power to disestablish infe-
rior federal courts cannot, even in combination, obliterate the right
of one in federal custody to present his claims, via habeas corpus or
an equivalent writ, to some federal judge: this is so because, through
explicit reference to habeas corpus, the Constitution has established
that a judicial remedy for illegal detention is indispensable. But it
does not seem quite so clear that the Constitution insists upon a judicial
remedy for all other deprivations of constitutional right. By way of
illustration: it would seem open to real doubt-the Fifth Amendment
notwithstanding-that there can be judicial enforcement of the right
to just compensation except as Congress authorizes a court to render
money judgments against the United States." Indeed, Marbury v.
Madison itself stands for the proposition that, absent a (constitutional)
legislatively created remedy, official illegality is, from a court's per-
spective, damnum absque injuria.12 And even the Congress which
drafted the First Judiciary Act-the Congress led by Ellsworth and
Madison and others of the Framers-conferred on the new lower fed-
eral courts, and on the new Supreme Court (in its appellate authority
over federal and state courts), only a portion of the judisdiction con-
templated by Article III. It is, in short, a familiar fact that for substan-
tial periods of our national experience there have been constitutional
questions of great moment which-although they presented themselves
in an appropriate "case" or "controversy"-could not reach the Su-
preme Court. If we add this history to the history so patiently explored
by Berger, the full complexity of the issues begins to emerge.
It may be useful to recall, for example, that only since 1914 has the
10. R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME CouRT 336-37 (1969) [hereinafter cited as.BFrcE].
11. Berger's attack on sovereign immunity as an overrated concept does not, It is sub-
mitted, yield a different conclusion. See BRacrE, ch. 10.
12. Cf. Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). It is of course true that
the illegality in Marbury was a violation of a statutory, not a constitutional, obligation
owing to the plaintiff; the point is simply that no inexorable logic requires that tile ]tt.
diciary be available to vindicate every departure from the law's requirements, Otier
agencies of government may also be capable of remedial action. Sometimes (e.g., when It
is asserted that a war is "unconstitutional') the political process may be the best, or
only, remedy.
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Supreme Court had power to review state court decisions denying the
validity of state laws challenged on federal constitutional grounds.
Is there serious doubt that Congress could quite constitutionally put
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction back in its status quo ante
1914, notwithstanding that, in the absence of such revisory authority,
state supreme courts could without hindrance strike down state laws
on the basis of what might frequently be rather parochial constructions
of the Constitution?13 The problem would of course become more
difficult if Congress withdrew from the Supreme Court appellate cog-
nizance of all state cases in which a state law was challenged on federal
constitutional grounds, whether the state courts sustained or invalidated
the disputed provisions of state law. One may grant that such an ar-
rangement-with its open invitation to disuniformity in the enforce-
ment of federal guarantees-would be wildly imprudent (and especially
so if the lower federal courts were also to have their jurisdiction over
such cases withdrawn). But is it clear that such a narrowing of the
Supreme Court's appellate authority would be unconstitutional?
14
The question which chiefly concerns Berger would become most
acute if Congress were to attempt drastically to curtail the opportunities
of state and federal courts, including the Supreme Court, to review
federal legislation. In such an event-as would not be the case in the
instances involving state legislation-Congress would seem to be under-
taking to frustrate the very mechanism by which it was intended to be
policed.15
One can, of course, postulate federal laws, passed pursuant to the
"exceptions" clause, purporting to withdraw from Supreme Court re-
view vast domains of litigation challenging state and federal action-all
church-state cases, for example, or all reapportionment cases. But laws
of such breadth are likely to provoke the coalescing opposition of many
interest groups, and hence are extremely difficult of enactment. A far
more likely legislative effort is that which seeks to "overrule" a partic-
ular disfavored decision. For example, it was the express intention of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, in the version of Title II of the Omni-
13. Compare Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911), with Colo.
rado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 149 Colo. 259, 363 P.2d 970,
rev'd, 372 U.S. 714 (1963).
14. Whether or not "unconstitutional," such an "exception" would certainly be what
might be termed "anti-constitutional"--flagrantly contemptuous of what Madison and
others in the Convention saw as a central part of the constitutional plan.
15. But recall Holmes's markedly contrasting view:
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to dledare
an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not
make that declaration as to the laws of the several States.
O0.W. HoLmEs, Law and the Court, in CouEaDra LGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920).
977
The Yale Law Journal
bus Crime Control bill of 1968 brought to the Senate floor, to legislate
Miranda'6 out of existence: the device sought to be utilized was to
deny to any federal court, including the Supreme Court, power to
"reverse, vacate, modify, or disturb in any way" (a) a federal trial court's
ruling that a confession is "voluntary" and hence admissible where
"such ruling is supported by any competent evidence admitted at the
trial" or (b) a comparable ruling of a state trial court "affirmed or other-
wise upheld by the highest court of the State having appellate juris-
diction of the cause." Whether viewed as limitations on the appellate
authority of the Supreme Court (or lower federal courts) or as limi-
tations on the authority of a federal court sitting in habeas corpus,
these provisions would have been unconstitutional-not so much be-
cause they were attempted withdrawals of jurisdiction to hear con-
stitutional cases as because they were attempted invasions by the legis-
lature of the judicial province. So long as a federal court is not ousted
of its authority to hear a case or class of cases, it may-indeed it con-
stitutionally must-resist legislative instruction with respect to the
mode and scope of its adjudication of the constitutional issues which
the case presents. Justice Rutledge put the matter succinctly a quarter
of a century ago:
It is one thing for Congress to withhold jurisdiction. It is entirely
another to confer it and direct that it be exercised in a manner
inconsistent with constitutional requirements or, what in some
instances may be the same thing, without regard to them.... There
are limits to the judicial power. Congress may impose others. And
in some matters Congress or the President has the final say under
the Constitution. But whenever the judicial power is called into
play, it is responsible directly to the fundamental law and no other
authority can intervene to force or authorize the judicial body to
disregard it.17
What Rutledge postulated was soon reduced by Hart to a phrase-
.. jurisdiction always is jurisdiction only to decide constitutionally."'"
And to this must be added Hart's statement of the measure of the
"exceptions" clause: "The measure is simply that the exceptions must
not be such as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in
the constitutional plan."' 0 Of this latter axiom Berger's book is a
valuable annotation.
16. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
17. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 468 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
18. Hart, supra note 7, at 1402.
19. Id. 1365. Query whether the radical "exception" conjectured about p. 977 supra,
could pass muster under Hart's standard.
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